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I. INTRODUCTION
THE exposure of confidential messages into the wirelesstransmission medium makes the legitimate transmission
vulnerable due to (i) the openness of wireless transmission
medium; and (ii) the standardization of wireless transmis-
sion schemes, e.g., coding and modulation schemes. The
conventionally widely used approach called the cryptography
technique is placed at the upper layer under the critical
assumptions of (i) error-free links at physical layer; and (ii)
incapability of eavesdroppers to decrypt the secret key due
to limited computational power. It is predicted that in the
near future the quantum computing will be able to easily
break the current strong public-key cryptosystems [1]. Besides,
issues like computational complexity and key distribution
and management in some emerging decentralized networks
(e.g., sensor or radio-frequency identification (RFID) net-
works) makes it difficult to deploy public-key infrastructure
[2]. Against this background, numerous works suggest that
a security additional be achieved by making full use of the
impairments (i.e., noise and fading) of wireless communication
links [3]. In other words, under the cover of noise and
interference, private messages can be securely transmitted to
the legitimate receivers at the physical layer in the presence of
an unauthorized devices or a potential malicious eavesdropper.
Consequently, research efforts were shifted to seek a cost-
efficient and effective solution to address the secrecy concern
from the physical layer of the layer-structure protocol.
An appealing countermeasure, known as physical layer
security (PLS), was found suitable for preventing eavesdrop-
ping attacks on wireless communication from the information-
theoretic perspective. Two pioneering works were respectively
laid by Shannon [4] and Wyner [5], where the notion of
perfect secrecy and wiretap channel model were respectively
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introduced. It is noteworthy to point out that Wyner’s result
established the PLS from the system model level, where he
considered the three-user scenario, consisting of a source (Al-
ice), an intended legitimate user (Bob), and an eavesdropper
(Eve) over the discrete memoryless wiretap channel. In [6],
Wyner’s wiretap model was extended to the Gaussian wiretap
channel, Leung et al. also defined the secrecy capacity as the
difference between the channel capacity of the main channel
(Alice to Bob) and that of the wiretap channel (Alice to Eve).
The conceptual beauty of secrecy capacity indicates that only
when the legitimate link experiences better quality of received
signals compared to the wiretap channel, positive secrecy can
thereafter be surely guaranteed. In the last few decades, a
growing body of secrecy metrics investigations over wiretap
fading channels were conducted, e.g., [7], [8]. The insights
drawn from these works offer mathematical proofs that the
fading property of wireless channels can be reversely used to
enhance secrecy. To this end, various researchers from both the
wireless communication and signal processing communities
were inspired to explore this effective secrecy enhancement
solution.
Observing the existing surveys and tutorial works related
to the PLS [2], [9]–[14], techniques like information-theoretic
security, artificial-noise aided security, security-oriented beam-
forming, security diversity methods, and physical layer secret
key generation are listed in [11] by Zou et al. As an organic
part of PLS techniques, information-theoretic security have
been classified into three categories: (i) memoryless wiretap
channels; (ii) Gaussian wiretap channels; and (iii) fading wire-
tap channels, however, the majority of information-theoretic
security is centered around the fading wiretap channels, see
references [7], [8], [15]. To be specific, Bloch et al. in
[7] examined the impact of the fading property of wireless
channels on the secrecy issue and thereafter proposed the
feasibility of the average secure communication rate and the
outage probability as secrecy metrics. Later on, Gopala et
al. in [8] established the perfect secrecy capacity over the
fading wiretap channel model when (i) the full channel state
information (CSI) are available at the transmitter; and (ii) only
the main channel CSI is perfectly known at the transmitter. In
addition, the on/off power allocation strategy was proposed
as a transmission policy, i.e., Alice can perform information
transmission as long as the channel gain of the legitimate user
is larger than a predetermined positive threshold.
Since then, numerous works have analyzed the secrecy
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performance over a diverse body of fading channels, just to
name some, Rayleigh [7], Nakagami-m, Weibull [16], Rician
(Nakagami-q) [17], Hoyt (Nakagami-n) [18], [19], Lognormal
[20], α − µ (equivalently generalized gamma) [21]–[25],
κ− µ [26]–[29], η − µ [30], generalized-K [31]–[34], extend
generalized-K (EGK) [35], Fisher-Snedecor F [36], gamma-
gamma [37], shadowed κ − µ [38], double shadowed Rician
[39], Fox’s H-function [35], cascaded Rayleigh/Nakagami-
m/α− µ [40]–[42], α− κ− µ/α− η − µ [43], Beaulieu-Xie
[44], α− κ− η − µ [45], [46], two-wave with diffuse power
(TWDP) [15], N -wave with diffuse power (NWDP) [47],
κ − µ/Gamma [48], Fluctuating Beckmann [49], correlated
Rayleigh [50], correlated α − µ [51], correlated shadowed
κ− µ [52], mixed η− µ and Ma´laga [53], Ma´laga [54], [55],
fluctuating two-ray (FTR) channels [56], [57]. The usage of
these fading channels are examined practical and feasible in
various wireless communications, such as, cellular device-to-
device (D2D), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications [27],
mmWave communications [56], underwater acoustic commu-
nications (UAC), frequency diverse array (FDA) communi-
cations [58], body-centric fading channels, unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) systems, land mobile satellite (LMS), etc. [38],
[59].
To the authors’ best knowledge, no survey papers so far have
focused on the secrecy metrics analysis over various fading
channels. To this end, the main contributions of this work are
listed as follows:
1) presenting the state-of-the-art of information-theoretic
secrecy analysis works over four kinds of wiretap fading
models, (i) small-scale, (ii) large-scale, (iii) composite,
and (iv) cascaded.
2) summarizing and comparing three useful secrecy anal-
ysis approaches, i.e., mixture gamma (MG), mixture of
Gaussian (MoG), and Fox’s H-function based solutions.
The insights drawn herein show that these three tools are
useful to encompass most existing secrecy analysis works
by properly configuring the fading channel characteristics
in the manner of the mathematical expressions of the
three tools.
3) providing a list set of secrecy enhancement solutions,
including the on-off transmission scheme, artificial noise
(AN) and artificial fast fading (AFF), jamming approach,
antenna selection, and security region for the classical
wiretap channel model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents the classic wiretap model and the problem formu-
lation. In III, we divide the secrecy metrics analysis works
into four categories according to the fading channel model
and consequently present three useful and proven tools used to
assist the secrecy metrics analysis. In Section IV, we introduce
the secrecy enhancement schemes based on classical wiretap
fading channels. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
Consider the classic Alice-Bob-Eve wiretap channel model,
shown in Fig. 1, where a transmitter (Alice) intends to send
Transmitter
(Alice)
Legitimate receiver
(Bob)
Eavesdropper
(Eve)
Private messages
Interference
Fig. 1: A three-node wireless wiretap system model.
confidential messages to the legitimate receiver (Bob) in
the presence of a malicious eavesdropper (Eve). The link
between Alice and Bob is called the main channel while
the one between Alice and Eve is the wiretap channel. The
instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob (B) and Eve
(E) is expressed as γi = γ¯igi, i ∈ {B,E}, where γ¯i is the
average received SNR and gi is the channel gain, which can
be modeled by any of the aforementioned fading distributions.
B. Secrecy metrics
Assuming the availability of perfect CSI at all terminals.
According to [7], the instantaneous secrecy capacity for one
realization of the (γB , γE) pair over quasi-static wiretap fading
channels is given by
Cs(γB , γE) =
log2 (1 + γB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CM
− log2 (1 + γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CW
+ , (1)
where [x]+
4
= max(x, 0). CM and CW are the channel
capacity of main and wiretap channels, respectively.
Based on the definition of the instantaneous secrecy capac-
ity, secrecy metrics including the secrecy outage probability
(SOP), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ),
average secrecy capacity (ASC), and ergodic secrecy capacity
are henceforth developed for the sake of evaluating the security
of all kinds of wireless systems.
1) Secrecy outage probability (SOP): Considering the pas-
sive eavesdropping scenario, where Alice transmits private
messages at a constant secrecy rate Rt whilst in the presence
of a passive Eve, who only listens to the main channel with-
out sending any probing messages. Against this background,
perfect secrecy can be assured only when Rt falls below the
instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs. Strikingly, the SOP metric
is commonly seen as a crucial secrecy indicator to measure the
level that how perfect secrecy is compromised. Mathematically
speaking, the SOP is the probability that the instantaneous
secrecy capacity is lower than a predetermined secrecy rate
Rt,
Pout = Pr (Cs ≤ Rt) . (2)
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2) The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ):
The PNZ is regarded as another important secrecy metric that
measures the existence of positive secrecy capacity with a
probability,
Pnz = Pr (Cs > 0)
Rt=0= 1− Pr(Cs ≤ Rt)
= Pr(γB > γE).
(3)
From (3), usually, the PNZ metric can be easily obtained from
the SOP metric by setting Rt = 0.
3) Average secrecy capacity (ASC): When an active eaves-
dropper appears, the average secrecy capacity serves as a
useful measurement that guides Alice to adapt its transmission
rate based on CM and CN so as to achieve perfect secrecy. In
other words, the ASC is a secrecy metric that evaluates how
much achievable secrecy rate can be guaranteed for the whole
system. It is mathematically defined as
C¯ = E [Cs(γB , γE)], (4)
where E [·] is the expectation operator.
4) Ergodic secrecy capacity: As an appropriate secrecy
measure to characterize the time-varying feature of wireless
channels, the ergodic secrecy capacity is resultantly utilized to
quantify the ergodic features of wireless channels [25], [60]–
[63]. The ergodic secrecy capacity is mathematically evaluated
by averaging the channel capacity over all fading channel
realizations, which is computed as
E(Cs) = [E [log2(1 + γB)]− E [log2(1 + γE)]+ . (5)
III. SECRECY CHARACTERIZATION
A. Exact secrecy analysis
In wireless communication systems, the transmitted signals
are reflected, diffracted, and scattered from objects that are
present on their path to the receiver. The received signals
experience fading (multipath) and shadowing (signal power
attenuation or pathloss) phenomena, which pose destructive
and harmful impacts at the receiver sides. The essence of
PLS is to reversely use the impairments of wireless channels
as secrecy enhancement means. Under the assumption that
the main and wiretap channels undergo independent fading
conditions. This section mainly presents the secrecy analysis
over wiretap fading channels according to the existing fading
channel categories.
1) Small-scale fading channels: The random changes in
signal amplitude and phase from the spatial positioning be-
tween a receiver and a transmitter is referred to small-
scale fading. The well-known small-scale fading models are
Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, Rician, α− µ (equivalently, general-
ized gamma or Stacy), etc. The simple and tractable form of
these models makes small-scale fading appealing and popular
in the security and reliability performance analysis. Examples
can be found in [7], [17], [21]–[24], where SOP, PNZ, and
ASC are analyzed by devising either closed-form or highly
tight approximated expressions. It is noteworthy of mentioning
that the α − µ distribution can be reduced to Rayleigh (α =
2, µ = 1), Nakagami-m (α = 2, µ = m), Weibull (α is the
fading parameter, µ = 1), and gamma (α = 1, µ is the fading
parameter) distributions by properly attributing the values of
α and µ. To this end, the applicability and flexibility of the
α − µ distribution have been well explored in the literature.
In addition, the TWDP fading model is also of high flexibility
as it includes Rayleigh, Rician, and hyper-Rayleigh fading as
special cases. Besides, it can also model a link worse than
Rayleigh fading. It characterizes propagating scenarios where
the received signal contains two strong, specular multipath
waves. The PLS investigation over TWDP wiretap fading
channels was studied in [15]. Apart from the aforementioned
works, in [64], the authors studied the effect of eavesdroppers’
location uncertainty on the SOP metric, where Eve is supposed
to be located in a ring-shaped area around Alice and undergoes
Rayleigh fading.
Another interesting direction of PLS over small-scale fading
channels lies in the secrecy investigation over correlated fading
channels. The correlation is caused due to the distances
between Bob and Eve, or the scattering environments, etc.
The physical correlation essentially makes the fading statistics,
i.e., the mathematical representation of the joint PDF of γB
and γE , fairly complex and eventually makes it intractable
and highly difficult to obtain exact closed-form secrecy per-
formances, instead, secrecy bounds are derived (see references
[50], [51]).
2) Large-scale fading channels: The so-called large-scale
fading results from signal attenuation due to signal propagation
over large distances and diffraction around large objects (i.e.,
hills, mountains, forests, billboards, buildings, etc.) in the
propagation path. One widely studied example of large-scale
fading channels is the lornormal distribution, however its
complex mathematical form hinders the derivation of exact
reliability and secrecy performance expressions. For instance,
Pan et al. in [20] investigated the PLS over non-small scale
fading channels, wherein independent/correlated lognormal
fading channels and composite fading channels were consid-
ered and highly accurate approximated secrecy representations
were derived.
3) Composite fading channels: Different from the small-
scale (fading) and large-scale (shadowing) fading models,
composite fading models are proposed to account for the ef-
fects of both small-scale and large-scale fading simultaneously.
For instance, Kumar et al. in [27] presented the SOP, PNZ,
and ASC over κ−µ fading channels and explored the obtained
results in a diverse range of wireless communication scenarios,
including cellular D2D, body area networks (BAN), and V2V.
Moualeu and Hamouda in [29] subsequently extended the
results in [27] to the single-input multiple-output (SIMO)
scenario and derived the ASC and lower bound of SOP.
More recently, to elaborate the shadowing effect of wireless
channels, in [39], [52], the authors investigated the secrecy
performance over the shadowed Rician and κ − µ wiretap
fading channels.
Other widely used models, e.g., Rayleigh/Lognormal
(RL), Nakagami-m/Lognormal (NL), generalized-K, gamma-
gamma, and Fisher-Snedecor F , are examined in realistic
wireless communication scenarios to model the channel-
induced physical layer dynamics. To be specific, the Fisher-
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Snedecor F fading model was proposed to characterize device-
to-device (D2D) communications, where its simplicity and
feasibility are compared with the generalized-K fading model
in [65]. Similarly, the gamma-gamma, mixed η–µ and Ma´laga,
Ma´laga distributions were shown feasible to accurately model
the radio frequency-free space optical (RF-FSO) links, and the
secrecy performance over those fading models are respectively
provided in [53]–[55], [66]. To encompass more special fading
models in one distribution, secrecy analysis over α − η − µ,
α−κ−µ, and α−η−κ−µ fading models is investigated in [43],
[45], [46]. For example, the α−η−κ−µ model can be realized
to the Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, Rician, κ − µ, η − µ, α − µ,
etc. Those models are highly general and flexible, however its
complex mathematical representation of characteristics makes
it difficult to derive the exact closed-form secrecy metrics.
4) Cascaded fading channels: Cascaded fading models
were found feasible to characterize the multi-hop non-
regenerative amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying with fixed
gain, the propagation in the presence of keyholes, and the
keyhole/pinhole phenomena in MIMO systems, as well as
the quite recent proposed intelligent reflective surface (IRS)
scenario [67]. Yang et al. in [67] modeled the IRS-aided main
link as a multiplication of two Rayleigh distributed random
variable. For vehicular networks, the secrecy performance
has been investigated considering the double Rayleigh fading
channels. For other works over cascaded Nakagami-m/Fisher-
Snedecor F /α − µ wiretap fading channels, the readers are
referred to [40]–[42], [68], [69]. As discussed earlier, the
cascaded α−µ fading channel similarly includes the cascaded
Rayleigh, cascaded Nakagami-m, cascaded Weibull, and cas-
caded gamma distributions. We have in [42] studied the SOP,
PNZ, and ASC performances with closed-form expressions,
which are given in terms of Fox’s H-function. The obtained
results therein are identical to the exact analytical representa-
tions given in [68], [69].
The majority of information-theoretic security analysis
works over wiretap fading channels are summarized and their
contributions are highlighted in Table I.
B. Secrecy bounds
Due to the difficulty in deriving exact closed-form SOP and
ASC expressions, the lower bound of the SOP and ergodic
secrecy capacity are often regarded as effective alternatives.
1) Lower bound of SOP: The exact SOP can be accu-
rately approximated by its lower bound when (i) the given
transmission rate tends to zero, i.e., Rt → 0; and (ii) Eve is
closely located to Alice, which can be physically interpreted
as Eve having an extremely high average received SNR, i.e.,
γ¯E → ∞. In this context, the lower bound of SOP can be
computed as
PLout =
∫ ∞
0
FB
(
2Rtγ
)
fE(γ)dγ. (6)
Such an alternative has been widely investigated (see refer-
ences [21], [22], [31], [36], [42]), and was shown to provide
a fairly tight approximation.
TABLE I: MAJOR INFORMATION-THEORETIC SECRECY
ANALYSIS WORKS OVER THE CLASSICAL WIRETAP FADING
CHANNELS
Year References Contributions
2008 Bloch et al. [7] derived simple and exact SOP, PNZ,
and ASC closed-form expressions over
Rayleigh fading channels
2013 Liu [16], [17] derived the PNZ over Rician and
Weibull fading channels
2014 Wang et al. [15] derived the ASC and SOP over TWDP
fading channels
2015-
2018
Lei et al. [21],
[23], Kong et al.
[22], [24]
analyzed the SOP, lower bound of SOP,
PNZ, and ASC over α − µ wiretap
fading channels.
2016
Pan et al. [20] proposed an highly accurate approxi-
mated secrecy solution over the log-
normal fading channels.
Bhargav et al. [27] derived the lower bound of SOP and
PNZ over κ− µ fading channels.
Lei et al. [31]–
[33]
analyzed the secrecy metrics over gen-
eralized-K fading channels.
2017 Saber and
Sadough [54]
derived the SOP, PNZ, and ASC over
the Ma´laga wiretap fading channels.
2018
Kong & Kaddoum
[36]
derived the SOP, lower bound of SOP,
PNZ and ASC over Fisher-Snedecor
F wiretap fading channels.
Kong et al. [42] derived closed-form expressions for the
SOP, PNZ, and ASC over cascaded
α− µ wiretap fading channels.
Mathur et al. [46] derived the ASC and SOP over α−η−
κ− µ wiretap fading channels.
2019
Kong & Kaddoum
[19]
analyzed the secrecy metrics with the
assistance of the MG distribution.
Kong et al. [35] analyzed the secrecy metrics over a
general and flexible Fox’s H-function
wiretap fading channels.
Moualeu et al.
[43]
derived closed-form expressions of
lower bound of SOP and their asymp-
totic behavior over the α − η − µ &
α− κ− µ fading channels.
Zeng et al. [56],
Zhao et al. [57]
analyzed the secrecy metrics over the
FTR wiretap fading channels.
2020
Kong et al. [70] proposed a unified secrecy analysis
framework with the help of MoG dis-
tribution.
Sa´nchez et al. [38] derived the closed-form expressions of
SOP and ASC metrics over shadowed
κ− µ fading channels.
Sa´nchez et al. [47] derived the exact and asymptotic SOP
behavior over NWDP fading channels.
2) Ergodic secrecy capacity: To overcome the intractability
of obtaining a closed-form ASC expression, the ergodic se-
crecy capacity is a widely adopted alternative to measure the
average ability of secrecy transmission over fading channels
in open literature [14]. For instance, in [71], the authors in-
vestigated the ergodic secrecy rate of downlink multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) systems with limited CSI feedback.
Moreover in [62], we have investigated the upper and lower
bounds of the ergodic secrecy capacity of MIMO systems
where zero-forcing (ZF) beamforming at Alice and ZF de-
tectors at Bob and Eve are exploited.
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C. Secrecy Analysis Tools
With the above in mind and under the assumption that
the main and wiretap channels undergo independent fading
conditions, this subsection will present three useful tools used
to assist the secrecy analysis.
1) Mixture Gamma (MG) distribution: According to [72],
[73], the instantaneous received SNR γ over wireless Rayleigh,
Nakagami-m, NL, κ − µ, Hoyt, η − µ, Rician, K, KG,
κ−µ/gamma, η−µ/gamma, and α−µ/gamma fading channels
can be reformulated using the MG distribution, whereas the
probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the instantaneous received SNR γ are
denoted as f(γ) and F (γ).
f(γ) =
L∑
l=1
αlγ
βl−1 exp(−ζlγ), (7a)
F (γ) =
L∑
l=1
αlζ
−βl
l Υ(βl, ζlγ), (7b)
where L is the number of terms in the mixture, while αl, βl,
and ζl are the parameters of the lth gamma component. Υ(·, ·)
is the upper incomplete gamma function.
The work in [32] used the MG distribution to assist the
information-theoretic secrecy analysis. Motivated by [19], the
secrecy metrics over the FTR and Ma´laga turbulence fading
channels [54], [56] can be similarly derived using the MG
distribution.
2) Mixture of Gaussian (MoG) distribution: Based on the
unsupervised expectation-maximization (EM) learning algo-
rithm, the MoG distribution is essentially beneficial when
the characteristics of the fading channel are unavailable. In
[74], the authors modeled the RL, NL, η − µ, κ − µ, and
shadowed κ− µ fading channels using the MoG distribution.
The findings of [74] showcases that the MoG distribution is
especially advantageous to approximate any arbitrarily shaped
non-Gaussian density, and can accurately model both compos-
ite and non-composite channels in a simple expression.
Assuming γ follows the MoG distribution, its PDF and CDF
are written as
f(γ) =
C∑
l=1
wl√
8piγ¯ηl
√
γ
exp
(
− (
√
γ/γ¯ − µl)2
2η2l
)
, (8a)
F (γ) =
C∑
l=1
wlΦ
(√
γ/γ¯ − µl
ηl
)
, (8b)
where C represents the number of Gaussian components.
wl > 0, µl, and ηl are the lth mixture component’s weight,
mean, and variance with
∑C
l wl = 1, Φ(x) is the CDF of the
standard normal distribution.
3) Fox’s H-function distribution: For known fading char-
acteristics, the Fox’s H-function distribution is a general
and flexible tool that can model the instantaneous received
SNR. It is reported in [35], [75]–[77] that many well-known
distributions in the literature, e.g., Rayleigh, Exponential,
Nakagami-m, Weibull, α − µ, gamma, Fisher-Snedecor F ,
Chi-square, cascaded Rayleigh/Nakagami-m/α − µ, gamma-
gamma, Ma´laga, KG, EGK, etc., can be represented using
Fox’s H-function distribution. For examples, interested readers
are suggested to refer to Table. II.
Assuming γ follows Fox’s H-function distribution, its PDF
and CDF are given by
f(γ) = KHm,np,q
[
Cγ
∣∣∣∣ (a1, A1), · · · , (ap, Ap)(b1, B1), · · · , (bq, Bq)
]
, (9a)
F (γ) =
K
C
×Hm,n+1p+1,q+1
[
Cγ
∣∣∣∣(1, 1), (a1 +Al, A1), · · · , (ap +Ap, Ap)(b1 +B1, B1), · · · , (bq +Bq, Bq), (0, 1)
]
,
(9b)
where Hm,np,q [.] is the univariate Fox’s H-function [78, Eq.
(8.4.3.1)], K > 0 and C are constants such that ∫∞
0
f(γ)dγ =
1. Ai > 0 for i = 1, · · · , p, Bl > 0 for l = 1, · · · , q, 0 ≤
m ≤ q, and 0 ≤ n ≤ p. For notational convenience, let a =
(a1, · · · , ap), A = (A1, · · · , Ap), b = (b1, · · · , bq), and B =
(B1, · · · , Bq). Thus, hereafter the Fox’s H-function is denoted
as Hm,np,q (K, C, a,A , b,B).
For the purposes of comparing the secrecy analysis by
using the three aforementioned approaches, the PNZ metric
is taken as an example. Provided that the main and wiretap
links undergo the same fading conditions, the PNZ expressions
are given in terms of the Gauss Hypergeometric function [19,
Eq. (7)], error function [70, Eq. (9)], and Fox’s H-function
[35, Eq. (16)]. In Fig. 2, we plotted the PNZ performance
versus γ¯B for different fading channel models. Their tightness
and accuracy have already been individually presented and
confirmed in [19], [35], [70].
Remark: Conclusively speaking, the MG, MoG, and Fox’s
H-function distributions have demonstrated their feasibility
and applicability when analyzing secrecy metrics. They all are
valid when the main channel and wiretap channel are subjected
to different wireless channels as shown in Fig. 2. (a). Note that
the three aforesaid solutions are unfeasible when the main
and wiretap channels are correlated.
D. Outdated & imperfect & correlated CSI
The aforementioned works mainly focus on the scenario that
perfect CSI is available at all parties. Such an assumption is
unrealistic, since in practice outdated CSI and imperfect CSI
are the general cases due to the time varying nature of wireless
channels and the channel estimation errors.
In [79], the effects of outdated CSI on secrecy performance
was investigated over multiple-input single-output (MISO)
systems when the transmit antenna selection (TAS) scheme
is applied at Alice. The obtained analytical results show
that the diversity gain of using multiple antenna techniques
cannot be achieved when the CSI is outdated during the TAS
process. Later on in [80], Hu et al. adopted the on-off-based
transmission scheme at Alice to efficiently take advantage
of the useful information in the outdated CSI. Alice does
transmission only when she has a better link to Bob compared
with that to Eve. Perfect knowledge of the main and wiretap
channel CSI are always favorable, but the existence of noise
in the channel estimation process makes it an unrealistic
assumption. The impacts of imperfect CSI have been widely
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TABLE II: FOX’S H -EQUIVALENTS OF TYPICAL AND GENERALIZED STATISTICAL MODELS
Fading model m n p q K C a b A B
Rayleigh 1 0 0 1 1
γ¯
1
γ¯
- 0 - 1
Nakagami-m 1 0 0 1 m
Γ(m)γ¯
m
γ¯
- m− 1 - 1
Weibull 1 0 0 1
Γ(1+ 2
α
)
γ¯
Γ(1+ 2
α
)
γ¯
- 1− 2
α
- 2
α
α− µ 1 0 0 1 Γ(µ+
2
α
)
Γ(µ)2γ¯
Γ(µ+ 2
α
)
Γ(µ)γ¯
- µ− 2
α
- 2
α
Maxswell 1 0 0 1 3√
piγ¯
3
2γ¯
- 1
2
- 1
N ∗ (α− µ) N 0 0 N
N∏
i=1
Γ(µi+
2
αi
)
Γ(µi)2γ¯
N∏
i=1
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Fig. 2: Illustration of Pnz versus γ¯Bγ¯E using the MG, MoG, and Fox’s H-function distributions when γ¯E = 0dB, (a) the main
channel undergoes KG (mB = 2.5, kB = 4) fading while the wiretap channel experiences KG, Rician, Hoyt, Rayleigh, and
Nakagami-m (m = 3.5) fading; (b) the main and wiretap channels undergo same fading while using the MoG distribution;
and (c) the main and wiretap channels undergo same fading while using the Fox’s H-function distribution.
explored in diverse research topics, e.g., imperfect CSI in
the artificial-noise-assisted training and communication [81],
imperfect CSI with an active full-duplex eavesdropper [82],
imperfect CSI in a mixed RF/FSO system [37], etc.
Apart from the above two scenarios, the correlation between
the main channel and wiretap channel is also attracting a
growing body of research interests. In [50], Jeon et al. explored
the secrecy capacity bounds considering correlated Rayleigh
fading channels. The results quantitatively showcased how
much of secrecy capacity is lost due to channel correlation. In
continuation of this work, the secrecy analysis exploration over
correlated Nakagami-m, correlated α−µ, correlated shadowed
κ−µ fading channels can be respectively found in [51], [52],
[83].
IV. SECRECY ENHANCEMENT APPROACHES
The essence of PLS is to utilize the impairments (e.g.,
fading, noise, interference, and path diversity) of wireless
channels to enhance secrecy. In this section, we mainly focus
on comparing the existing secrecy enhancement techniques
suitable for classical wiretap channels.
A. On-off transmission scheme
Considering imperfect channel estimation, He and Zhou in
[61] first proposed the on-off transmission scheme to improve
the reliability and security performance. The principle of on-
off transmission lies in the comparison between the estimated
instantaneous SNRs at Bob (γˆB) and Eve (γˆE) and two given
corresponding thresholds i.e., µB and µE , to be specific, only
when γˆB ≥ µB and γˆE ≤ µE , the ”on” mode at Alice
is activated, otherwise, Alice is in ”off” mode. The on-off
transmission scheme is alternatively an appealing candidate to
allow the SOP metric be arbitrarily small. Building on He’s
work, the on-off transmission is widely investigated in the
following secrecy works [80], [84]–[86], where the imperfect
CSI, outdated CSI, and correlated CSI are considered.
B. Jamming approach
Assuming the transmitter has more antennas than the eaves-
dropper, Goel and Negi proposed the concept of artificial noise
(AN) in [87]. The principle behind AN is that the transmitter
uses some of its available power to generate AN to confuse
passive eavesdroppers. Consequently, Wang et al. in [88]
proposed the artificial fast fading (AFF) secrecy enhancement
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scheme, where the randomized beamforming is employed at
the transmitter in order to ‘upgrade’ the main channel to an
AWGN one and degrade the wiretap channel to a fast fading
channel.
Different from the aforementioned transmitting
beamforming-based techniques, namely AN and AFF,
the quality of the wiretap link is further degraded by
allocating part of the transmitting resources (i.e., power or
antennas) at the transmitter, specifically to Eve. Based on
the surveys in [89], [90], one can conclude that jamming is
another useful means to further enhance PLS. Considering the
three-node wiretap fading channel, jamming can be realized
by a full-duplex Bob, where Bob would receive signals
from Alice and send jamming signals (i.e., noise) to Eve in
order to reduce Eve’s received SNR quality [91]. Bob and
Eve usually only act purely as a legitimate receiver or an
illegitimate eavesdropper. However, practically speaking, they
might behave with multiple roles. For instance, in [82], an
active eavesdropper operates in full-duplex mode so that it
can send jamming signals to degrade the legitimate receiver’s
SNR, while in [92], [93], an untrustworthy relay works as
a relay and eavesdropper simultaneously in a bidirectional
cooperative network.
C. Antenna selection technique
In multiple-antenna systems, TAS is seen as an effective
way for reducing hardware complexity whilst boosting diver-
sity benefits. In [83], [86], [94]–[99], TAS is deployed as a
secrecy enhancement solution in MIMO systems. There exist
three kinds of TAS schemes: (i) the antenna that maximizes the
output instantaneous SNR at Bob is selected (see [94], [95]);
(ii) more than one single antenna are selected (see [96]); and
(iii) a general order of antenna are selected (see [98]).
Different from the works [94]–[97] assuming that the multi-
antenna channels are independent, quite recently, Si et al.
considered antenna correlation in [86], where the exact and
asymptotic SOP are derived with consideration of three di-
versity combining schemes, namely maximal ratio combining
(MRC), selection combining (SC), and equal gain combining
(EGC) at Bob. This work was extended in [83], where con-
tinuously took consideration of the joint antenna and channel
correlation, while the relationship between the correlation and
the SOP is analytically established.
D. Protected zones
Protected zones (equivalently, secrecy region) means a ge-
ometrical region (see [63], [100]), defined as the legitimate
receiver’s locations having a certain guaranteed level of se-
crecy, or an area where the set of ordered nodes can safely
communicate with typical destination, for a given secrecy
outage constraint [25], [101].
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have comprehensively summarized the
development of PLS over various wiretap fading channels.
Based on the channel characteristics, the existing secrecy anal-
ysis works are classified into four categories: (i) small-scale
fading; (ii) large-scale fading; (iii) cascaded fading; and (iv)
composite fading. By presenting and comparing some major
information-theoretic secrecy analysis works, we found three
useful and effective approaches, i.e., the MG, MoG, and Fox’s
H-function distributions, which are introduced to simplify the
secrecy analysis. The three aforesaid approaches are beneficial
since they can largely cover the existing fading models when
the main and wiretap channels experience independent fading
condition. In addition, we presented the existing secrecy
enhancement techniques deployed for Wyner’s wiretap channel
model, including on-off transmission, jamming approach, TAS
technique, and protected zones.
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